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ELIMINATION OF RACE AS A FACTOR IN LAW
SCHOOL ADMISSIONS: AN ANALYSIS OF
HOPWOOD V TEXAS
I. INTRODUCION
On March 18, 1996, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in Hopwood
v. Texas' held that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment2 does not allow race to be used as a factor in law school
admissions. Hopwood is one of the most recent decisions addressing the
controversial "legal and moral thicket" known as affirmative action.3
Although the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari,4 Hopwood
has the potential to significantly impact the future of affirmative action
programs and should capture the attention of law school admissions
committees across the nation.
This Note provides a summary of the facts and holdings of Hopwood,
as well as a background of the law on which the Hopwood decision
rested. Next, it provides an evaluation of the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals decision and, lastly, presents a critical analysis of the court's
reasoning and the decision's potential impact.
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Cheryl J. Hopwood, Douglas W. Carvell, Kenneth R. Elliott, and
David A. Rogers, all "nonminority"5 residents of the State of Texas,
applied to the University of Texas School of Law ("law school") for the
1992-1993 academic year.6 At that time, the law school employed an
admissions program which used race as a factor in its admissions
decisions.7 The goals of the law school's affirmative action admissions
program included achieving diversity and overcoming past effects of
1. 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996), rev'g 861 F. Supp. 551 (W.D. Tex. 1994), cert. denied, 116
S. Ct. 2580 (1996).
2. The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment states that "[n]o State
shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
3. Burt Neuborne, Notes for the Restatement (First) of the Law of Affirmative Action:
An Essay in Honor of Judge John Minor Wisdom, 64 TUL. L. REv. 1543, 1544 (1990).
4. 116 S. Ct. 2580 (1996).
5. "Nonminority" in the context of the Hopwood cases refers to any race or ethnicity
not including Mexican American or African American.
6. Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 938.
7. Id. at 934.
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discrimination.8
The admissions decisions for 1992-1993 admission to the law school
were made by a full admissions committee and a minority subcommit-
tee.9 After being placed in a color-coded folder indicating minority or
nonminority status,"° each application was placed in either the presump-
tive admit, discretionary, or presumptive denial category based on the
applicant's Texas Index ("TI")." At the discretion of one member of
the admissions committee, an application could be moved into a lower
category based on factors such as the caliber of undergraduate institution
and the competitiveness of major.12  Minority applications were not
only segregated and subject to a lower admissions standard based on the
applicant's TI, but each minority application also received extensive
consideration from all three members of the minority subcommittee if it
fell within the discretionary zone." The decision of the minority
subcommittee whether to grant admission to a discretionary zone
applicant was "virtually final." 4 In contrast, nonminority applications
in the discretionary zone were divided into groups of thirty and each
member of a three-member subcommittee was allowed to cast typically
nine to eleven votes per group in favor of admission. 5 Nonminority
applicants in the discretionary zone receiving two or more votes received
an offer, while those receiving one vote were placed on a waiting list and
those receiving no votes were denied admission. 6
Hopwood had an undergraduate G.P.A. of 3.8 and an LSAT score
of 39, giving her a TI of 199 and placing her at the low end of the
presumptive admit category for resident nonminorities 7  Carvell,
8. Hopwood v. Texas, 861 F. Supp. 551, 570 (W.D. Tex. 1994), rev'd, 78 F.3d 932 (5th
Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 2580 (1996).
9. Id. at 560.
10. Id.
11. Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 935. The TI was a formula written by the Law School Data
Assembly Service used to serve as a predictor of the success of first-year law students. AL at
n.1. By March 1992, Mexican Americans and blacks faced a presumptive admit TI of 189 or
higher and a presumptive denial TI of 179 or lower. Id. at 936-37. For nonminorities, the
presumptive admit TI was 199 or higher and the presumptive denial TI was 192 or lower. Id.
at 936.
12. Hopwood, 861 F. Supp at 561.
13. Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 937. Every minority candidate in the discretionary zone was
discussed at a meeting of the minority subcommittee. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 936. This voting procedure did not require a discussion of the committee.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 938. Since Hopwood's TI was at the bottom of the presumptive admit
category, it was reviewed by a member of the admissions committee. Id. A determination was
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Elliott, and Rogers each had a TI of 197, placing them at the high end
of the discretionary zone for resident nounminorities.'8 None of the
applicants were given an offer of admission. 9
The Plaintiffs filed suit in United States District Court, alleging that
the law school's affirmative action program violated the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.' Applying strict scrutiny as the
standard of review, the district court held that the law school admissions
program did not pass constitutional muster.21 The district court found
that although the law school had compelling government objectives of
obtaining a diverse student body' and of remedying present effects of
past discrimination,' the admissions process was not narrowly tailored
to achieve these ends because it treated minority applicants as a separate
class.24 However, the district court held that "the aspect of the law
school's affirmative action program giving minority applicants a 'plus' is
lawful."5
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the district court's ruling
that the law school's admission process was unconstitutional, but
reversed its holding that race could not be used as a factor in law school
admissions under the Fourteenth Amendment.' The court of appeals
held that under strict scrutiny, neither achieving diversity within the
student body27 nor remedying the effects of past discrimination serve
as sufficiently compelling state interests to justify using race as a factor
in making admissions decisions.
made by that member that she did not attend academically competitive undergraduate
institutions and that her G.P.A. likely was inflated. Id. Her application was therefore moved
into the discretionary zone. Hopwood, 861 F. Supp. at 564.
18. Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 938.
19. Id.
20. Hopwood, 861 F. Supp. at 553.
21. Id. at 584-85. Because the district court found that the plaintiff's equal protection
rights had been violated, each plaintiff was awarded nominal damages of one dollar and the
district court ordered that each be allowed to re-apply to the law school without paying
another application fee. Id. at 583.
22. Id. at 571.
23. Id. at 573. The effects found to satisfy a compelling government objective included
the law school's lingering reputation in the minority community as a "white school," an under-
representation of minorities in the student body, and a perception that the law school is a
hostile environment for minorities. I&. at 572.
24. Id. at 578-79.
25. Id. at 578.
26. Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 934.
27. Id. at 948.
28. Id. at 955.
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III. BACKGROUND OF THE LAW
Hopwood v. Texas is the most recent in a line of controversial cases
that have scrutinized affirmative action programs. The cases preceding
Hopwood indicate that this area of the law is characterized by tremen-
dous uncertainty. The standard of review used by the courts in cases
involving race-based programs has ranged from "a most searching
examination" standard to strict scrutiny, the latter of which currently is
the standard used in cases of benign racial classifications. It is also a
standard which could prove fatal to the constitutionality of affirmative
action programs.
A. Regents of the University of California v. Bakke
The legal controversy surrounding benign racial classifications began
with the Regents of University of California v. Bakke." Bakke involved
a constitutional challenge under the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the admissions program at the Medical
School of the University of California at Davis ("Davis"). Davis used a
special admissions program to reserve a specified number of spaces in its
entering class for minority students. ° The special admissions program
purportedly served four purposes: "(i) [to] reduc[e] the historic deficit
of traditionally disfavored minorities in medical schools and in the
medical profession; (ii) [to] counterf the effects of societal discrimina-
tion; (iii) [to] increas[e] the number of physicians who will practice in
communities currently underserved; and (iv) [to] obtain[] the educational
benefits that flow from an ethnically diverse student body."'"
29. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
30. Id. at 269-70. Like the program at issue in Hopwood, the admissions program at
issue in Bakke subjected applicants to two different admissions standards depending on
minority status. See id. at 274-75. The special admissions program considered Blacks,
Chicanos, Asians, and American Indians as minorities, Id. at 274. If the applicant indicated
that he or she was a member of one of these minority groups, the applicant was considered
separately under the special admissions program. Id. at 274-75. Allen Bakke, a white male
who was denied admissions to the medical school in 1973 and 1974, had a science G.P.A. of
3.44, an overall G.P.A. of 3.46, and MCAT percentiles of 96, 94, 97, and 72. Id. at 277 n.7.
In 1973, these numbers were slightly below the average numbers for regular admittees, but
significantly above those for special admittees. Id. In 1974, all of Bakke's numbers met or
exceeded the average of regular admittees and again were significantly above those of special
admittees. Id.
31. Id. at 306.
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Justice Powell, writing the lead opinion,32 declared the proper
standard of judicial review for suspect racial and ethnic classifications to
be strict scrutiny.3  In order to satisfy this "most exacting judicial
examination,"' Justice Powell determined that Davis must show a
constitutionally permissible and substantial interest or purpose and that
its use of a racial classification must be necessary to accomplish its
purpose." Under this analysis, Justice Powell rejected all but the fourth
stated purpose, achieving a diverse student body, as constitutionally
permissible.36 Justice Powell couched the constitutional permissibility
of this fourth purpose in the concept of "academic freedom 37 and
made two important qualifications: (1) that the student be "otherwise
qualified," and (2) that diversity be considered as one of several other
factors.38
In answering the question of whether a racial classification is
necessary to promote the compelling interest of diversity, Justice Powell
concluded that in this case, it did not. He concluded that the "fatal flaw"
of Davis' program was in its manner of application: minority applicants
could compete for every available seat in the class while nonminorities
could compete only for those not reserved for minorities; thus an
applicant's racial status as a nonminority excluded them from competing
for'a percentage of seats.39 Although the result in this case was that the
program did not satisfy strict scrutiny, Justice Powell's opinion left open
32. There was no majority opinion in this case. The lack of a majority opinion had a
significant effect on the weight accorded to it in later opinions. See e.g., infra notes 96, 99,
116 and accompanying text.
33. Id. at 291.
34. Id. Justice Powell then discussed the historical development of Equal Protection
jurisprudence and why this case presented a question of a suspect classification deserving of
the "most exacting judicial scrutiny." See id. at 291-305.
35. Id. at 305.
36. Justice Powell stated that the purpose of obtaining a certain percentage of minorities
was "discrimination for its own sake," and that the stated purpose of countering the effects
of societal discrimination, without a judicial, legislative, or administrative findings of a past
constitutional or statutory violation was "an amorphous concept of injury that may be ageless
in its reach into the past" and thus, also was not a compelling state interest. Ia& at 307.
Regarding this same purpose, Justice Powell stated that it "does not justify a classification that
imposes disadvantages upon third persons like respondent, who bear no responsibility for
whatever harm the beneficiaries of the special admissions program are thought to have
suffered." Id. at 310. He rejected the third purpose, increasing health-care services to
underserved communities, because there was no evidence to show that the special admissions
program furthered that goal. I&a
37. See id. at 312.
38. Id. at 314.
39. Id at 319-20.
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the possibility ... by holding that ... left open the possibility that a
"properly devised admissions program" could satisfy strict scrutiny by
holding that diversity could serve as a compelling state interest.4
B. Fullilove v. Klutznick
Two years later, in Fullilove v. Klutznick,4' the United States
Supreme Court held that a Congressional set-aside provision for minority
business enterprises (MBE provision) in the Public Works Employment
Act of 1977 did not violate the equal protection guarantees of the Fifth
Amendment.42 The MBE provision promulgated by Congress required
that applicants for federal contracting grants must show that at least ten
percent of the amount of each grant shall be used for minority business
enterprises.43 Chief Justice Burger, writing for a plurality, recognized
that "[a]ny preference based on racial or ethnic criteria must necessarily
receive a most searching examination to make sure that it does not
conflict with constitutional guarantees."'
The "most searching examination" standard of review applied by
Chief Justice Burger employed a two-part test. The first prong involved
a determination that the objectives of the legislation were within the
powers of Congress.' In this instance, the primary objective of the
legislation was to prevent practices by federal fund grantees that would
40. Justice Powell stated in Part V.C., a Part in which Justices Brennan, White, Marshall,
and Blackmun joined, that "the State has a substantial interest that legitimately may be served
by a properly devised admission program involving the competitive consideration of race and
ethnic origin." Id. at 320.
41. 448 U.S. 448 (1980). There was no majority opinion in this case. Chief Justice
Burger announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an opinion in which Justices
White and Powell joined.
42. Ild. at 492. The petitioners in Fulliove included a firm and several associations which
were involved in the construction industry. Id at 455. The petitioners alleged that they had
suffered economic injury as a result of enforcement of the MBE provision and that the
provision on its face violated the equal protection guarantees of the Constitution as well as
several other statutory antidiscrimination provisions. Id.
43. 42 U.S.C. § 6705(0(2) (1976). Minority business enterprises included businesses
owned by at least fifty percent minorities or, if the business was publicly held, minority
shareholders of at least fifty-one percent. Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 454. Minorities included
blacks, Spanish-speaking, Orientals, Indians, Eskimos, and Aleuts. Id. The presumption of
a past deprivation of opportunity based on race was rebuttable. Id. at 464.
44. Id at 491.
45. The Chief Justice found that the Spending Power, U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 1, and
the Commerce Power, U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 3, allowed Congress to promulgate the MBE
provision. Fullililove, 448 U.S. at 473-80. Furthermore, Chief Justice Burger stressed the
remedial powers of Congress under the Constitution in justifying Congress' power to devise
the MBE provision. Id. at 483.
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result in "perpetuation of the effects of prior discrimination which had
impaired or foreclosed access by minority businesses to public contract-
ing opportunities."'  The second prong involved a determination that
Congress may constitutionally use racial and ethnic criteria as a condition
attached to a federal grant as a means of achieving its objectives.47
The plurality qualified its holding of constitutionality by noting that
the MBE provision was "limited"48 and could be viewed as a "pilot
project."49 Chief Justice Burger also made reference to "the right to
experiment"5 and suggested that the administrative process could
provide remedies if the provision triggered improper use of racial and
ethnic criteria.5 In addition, he noted the significance of the availabili-
ty of a waiver, and that the two "congressional assumptions" underlying
the program were rebuttable. 2 Although the Court held that the MBE
provision passed constitutional muster on its face, Fullilove left open the
possibility that the manner of application of the provision may later
render the provision unconstitutional.
C. Richmond v. J.A. Croson, Co.
Almost a decade later, the Court was faced with determining the
constitutionality of a set-aside program similar to that in Fullilove, except
that this time the program was promulgated by a City Council rather
than by Congress. The Court held in Richmond v. J.A. Croson, Co.,53
46. Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 473.
47. The Court rejected the contenti.ons that Congress must be "color-blind" when acting
in the remedial context, that the program deprives nonminority businesses access to a portion
of government contracting opportunities, that the program is underinclusive, and that the pro-
gram is overinclusive. Id at 482, 484-86.
48. Id at 489.
49. Id
50. Id at 491 (quoting New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
51. See id at 489 ("That the use of racial and ethnic criteria is premised on assumptions
rebuttable in the administrative process gives reasonable assurance that the application of the
MBE program will be limited to accomplishing the remedial objectives contemplated by
Congress and that misapplications of the racial and ethnic criteria can be remedied.").
52. Id at 487. The two assumptions were:
(1) that the present effects of past discrimination have impaired the competitive
position of business owned and controlled by members of minority groups; and (2)
that affirmative efforts to eliminate barriers to minority-firm access, and to evaluate
bids with adjustment for the present effects of past discrimination, would assure that
at lest 10% of the federal funds granted under the [Act] would be accounted for by
contracts with available, qualified, bona fide minority business enterprises.
Id
53. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
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that an MBE set-aside program which required contractors in the city of
Richmond, Virginia to subcontract a minimum of thirty percent of its
contract to at least one MBE was unconstitutional under the Fourteenth
Amendment. 4 The majority held that, in light of its recent decision in
Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education,5 the proper standard of review
for "benign" or "remedial" racial classifications was strict scrutiny. 6
The Court went to great lengths to distinguish Fullilove, which used a
lesser standard of review, on the basis that Fullilove involved a program
mandated by Congress, a governmental body which is afforded broad
deference when using its power to enforce the Constitution. 7
Under strict scrutiny, the Court held that the City of Richmond failed
to demonstrate a compelling governmental interest which justified the
program. Specifically, the Court held that evidence of past discrimina-
tion in the construction industry as a whole was too general to justify the
use of the set-aside program. 8 The Court suggested that a compelling
state interest could exist if there was a demonstrated great statistical
disparity between eligible and participating MBE's;59 however, no such
showing was made.
Even though the Court found that the program did not satisfy the
54. Id at 477. The Minority Business Utilization Plan adopted by the Richmond City
Council defined a MBE as "[a] business at least fifty-one (51) percent of which is owned and
controlled ... by minority group members." Id. at 478. "Minority group members" included
"[c]itizens of the United States who are Blacks, Spanish-speaking, Orientals, Indians, Eskimos,
or Aleuts." Id. Of significance is the Plan's availability of a waiver of the MBE requirement,
which would be awarded only in "exceptional circumstances," such as if an MBE was
unavailable to act as a subcontractor. Id. at 478. The Appellee in this case was a construction
company denied a waiver and as a result lost its construction contract. See id at 481-83.
55. 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
56. Id at 493. By declaring strict scrutiny to be the proper standard of review, the Court
"reaffirm[ed] the view expressed by the plurality in Wygant that the standard of review under
the Equal Protection Clause is not dependent on the race of those burdened or benefited by
a particular classification." Id. at 494. The majority relied on the analysis in Wygant in
coming to this conclusion.
57. See id. at 486-91. See also supra note 45 and accompanying text.
58. Id. at 499. The Court stated that "[w]hile there is no doubt that the sorry history of
both private and public discrimination in this country has contributed to a lack of opportuni-
ties for black entrepreneurs .... an amorphous claim that there has been past discrimination
in a particular industry cannot justify the use of an unyielding racial quota." Id. In addition,
the Court found that "[t]here is absolutely no evidence of past discrimination against Spanish-
speaking, Oriental, Indian, Eskimo, or Aleut person in any aspect of the Richmond construc-
tion industry." Id. at 506. The Court also noted in its explanation of why there was no
compelling state interest that "where special qualifications are necessary, the relevant statistical
pool for purposes of demonstrating discriminatory exclusion must be the number of minorities
qualified to undertake the particular task." Id. at 501-02 (emphasis added).
59. Id at 503.
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first prong of strict scrutiny, it briefly addressed the issue of whether it
was narrowly tailored. Because the City gave no consideration to the
use of alternative, race-neutral means to accomplish the its goal,' and
because the Plan's waiver system did not inquire into whether a
particular MBE truly suffered from effects of prior discrimination,61 the
Court held that "such a program is not narrowly tailored to remedy the
effects of prior discrimination."'62
D. Metro Broadcasting v. FCC
Shortly after deciding Croson, the Court considered the constitution-
ality of benign racial classifications used by the FCC in Metro Broadcast-
ing, Inc. v. FCC.' Employing intermediate scrutiny, the Court held
that the FCC's racial classifications were not in violation of the equal
protection component of the Fifth Amendment.' 4 At issue in Metro
Broadcasting was a program created by the FCC that awarded an
enhancement credit for minority ownership in comparative hearings for
new broadcasting licenses65 and a minority "distress sale" program that
allowed only minority controlled firms to take over ownership of certain
existing radio and television broadcast stations.'
In determining the proper standard of review, the Court followed the
pronouncement in Fullilove and affirmed in Croson that "race-conscious
classifications adopted by Congress to address racial and ethnic
discrimination are subject to a different standard than similiar classifica-
tions constructed by state and local governments," 67 and, therefore,
60. The Court again distinguished Fullilove, this time on the basis that in that case, race-
neutral alternatives were carefully examined and rejected prior to the enactment of the set-
aside provision. Id at 507.
61. Id. at 508. In effect, this lack of inquiry created a presumption of disadvantage that
was not subject to challenge.
62. Id. at 508.
63. 497 U.S. 547 (1990), overruled by Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097
(1995).
64. Id. at 552.
65. Petitioner Metro Broadcasting, Inc. was originally granted, then denied, a
broadcasting license because another applicant was awarded a substantial enhancement due
to its minority ownership. Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. at 559. The other applicant's minority
credit ultimately outweighed Metro's advantages; thus, the other applicant was granted the
license. Id.
66. Id. The FCC defines minorities as "Black, Hispanic Surnamed, American Eskimo,
Aleut, American Indian, and Asiatic American extraction." Statement of Policy on Minority
Ownership of Broadcasting Facilities, 68 F.C.Cl.d 979, 980 n.8 (1978).
67. 497 U.S. at 565.
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employed the intermediate scrutiny standard.68 Accordingly, the Court
analyzed whether the policies "serve important governmental objectives
within the power of Congress and are substantially related to achieve-
ment of those objectives., 69 Under the first prong of this standard, the
Court found that promoting programming diversity was an important
governmental objective and that such an objective could properly serve
as a constitutional basis for the minority-favoring policies.7" The Court
reasoned that diversity was in the public interest and that the public had
a right to be exposed to diverse views.7" Under the second prong, the
Court found that a substantial relationship existed between the minority
ownership policies and the governmental objective of promoting
programming diversity.72
The Court also added a third prong to its intermediate scrutiny
analysis. Here, the Court held that the FCC policies could be upheld
only if they did not "impose undue burdens on nonminorities."'73
Because the Court did not believe that applicants had an expectation
that a license would be granted without consideration of minority
ownership as a public interest factor74 , and because procedures existed
to avoid being subject to the FCC "distress sale" policy,75 the Court
determined that nonminorities were not unduly burdened by the policies,
and, therefore, it held that the FCC program was constitutional.
68. The Court was greatly criticized in subsequent opinions for its use of intermediate
scrutiny. Specifically, Justice O'Connor, writing for the Court in Adarand attacked the Metro
Broadcasting Court for not applying the holding in Croson that benign racial classifications
enacted by state governments are subject to strict judicial scrutiny. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at
2097 (1995).
69. Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. at 565.
70. Id at 567-68.
71. Id. at 567.
72. Id. at 569-97. In making the determination that a substantial relationship existed, the
Court gave great weight to the experiences of the FCC and Congress, which had both
concluded at some juncture that programming diversity was fostered by participation of
minorities. Id. at 569-79.
73. Id. at 597. The Court quoted a passage from Justice Powell's opinion in Wygant to
support it's addition of this important prong: "As part of this Nation's dedication to eradicat-
ing racial discrimination, innocent persons may be called upon to bear some of the burden of
the remedy." Id. at 596 (quoting Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 280-81
(1986)).
74. Id at 596-600. Even if an expectation existed, it has been suggested that if the goal
of the program is remedial, the loss of the expectancy would not be determinative. Neuborne,
supra note 3, at 1550 ("When ... a third person is asked to forgo a mere expectancy or an
unearned advantage, the Court has held that the imperative of repairing a damaged institution
or righting a past wrong generally will justify using otherwise forbidden criteria.").
75. Id. at 484.
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E. Milwaukee County Pavers Ass'n v. Fielder
After Metro Broadcasting, the Seventh Circuit struck down as
unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment a program which set aside certain Wisconsin state-funded
construction projects for "disadvantaged business enterprises. 7 6 The
court of appeals did not apply a particular standard of review, but
instead relied upon the United States Supreme Court decisions in
Fullilove and Croson. From these decisions, the court of appeals gleaned
the lesson that "the federal government can, by virtue of the enforce-
ment clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, engage in affirmative action
with a freer hand than states and municipalities can do."" More
specifically, the court of appeals stated that only remedial purposes, not
disadvantage or diversity, would justify racial preferences by a state or
municipality.78 In dicta, the court of appeals suggested that if the
presumption that a certain race is disadvantaged was irrebuttable, the
program would very likely be unconstitutional.79
F Adarand Constructors, Inc v. Pena
Not long before Hopwood district court decision was appealed, the
United States Supreme Court overruled the holding in Metro Broadcast-
ing that congressionally mandated "benign" racial classifications need
only satisfy intermediate scrutiny. In Adarand Constructors, Inc v.
Pena, the Court also concluded that the decision it reached in
Fullilove-that federal racial classifications were subject to a lesser
standard of review than state or municipal classifications-no longer had
76. Milwaukee County Pavers Ass'n v. Fielder, 922 F.2d 419,421, (7th Cir. 1991), affg
731 F. Supp. 1395 (W.D. Wis. 1990). Under the program, a business enterprise is presumably
"disadvantaged" if fifty-one percent of its owners are black, Hispanic, Asian, American Indian,
or female. Id. at 422.
77. 922 F.2d at 424.
78. Id. at 422.
79. The program at issue in Milwaukee County Pavers actually permitted the state to
apply the presumption of social or economic disadvantage without investigating the situation
of the applicants; however, a third party could rebut the presumption by "'present[ing]
evidence that the [applicants] are not truly socially and/or economically disadvantaged, even
though they are members of one of the presumptive groups."' Milwaukee County Pavers, 922
F.2d at 425 (quoting 49 C.F.R. pt. 23, subpt. D, App. C). The court of appeals stated that the
state would be vulnerable to challenge under Croson "if it made the racial presumption in the
regulations irrebuttable, for that would be going beyond the authorization in the federal
program." Id
80. 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995).
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controlling value.81 Instead, the Court held that "all racial classifica-
tions, imposed by whatever federal, state, or local government actor,
must be analyzed by a reviewing court under strict scrutiny."'  In order
to pass constitutional muster under strict scrutiny, a racial classification
must be narrowly tailored to further a compelling governmental
interest.83
Adarand involved a constitutional challenge under the equal
protection component of the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause to
the federal government's use of race-based presumptions in identifying
"socially and economically disadvantaged individuals. ' 4 Delivering the
opinion of the Court, Justice O'Connor85 criticized the Court's reason-
ing in Metro Broadcasting.86 Justice O'Connor's analysis clarified the
past decisions of the Court and laid the groundwork for overruling Metro
81. 1d. at 2117.
82. Id. at 2113.
83. Id. at 2117.
84. Id. The Petitioner, Adarand Constructors, Inc., was denied a subcontracting job
despite the fact that it submitted the low bid. Id The contract was awarded instead to a
certified small business controlled by "socially and economically disadvantaged individuals"
which allowed the contractor to receive additional payment from the Federal Government.
Id. at 2104. The plaintiffs challenged that the presumption required by federal law that
provided that "[tlhe contractor shall presume that socially and economically disadvantaged
individuals include Black Americans, Hispanic Americans, Native Americans, Asian Pacific
Americans, and other minorities, or any other individual found to be disadvantaged by the
[Small Business] Administration pursuant to section 8(a) of the Small Business Act." 15
U.S.C. §§ 637(d)(2)(3). The Small Business Act defines "socially disadvantaged individuals"
as "those who have been subjected to racial or ethnic prejudice or cultural bias because of
their identity as a member of a group without regard to their individual qualities." 15 U.S.C.
§ 637(a)(5). The Act defines "economically disadvantaged individuals" as "those... whose
ability to compete in the free enterprise system has been impaired due to diminished capital
and credit opportunities as compared to others in the same business area who are not socially
disadvantaged." 15 U.S.C. § 637(a)(6)(A).
85. Justice O'Connor's opinion was joined by Justices Rehnquist, Kennedy, Thomas, and
Scalia, except with respect to Part 111-C, which analyzed the principles of precedent and stare
decisis. See id. at 2101.
86. Id. at 2112. Justice O'Connor presented a well-written summary of the cases which
preceded Metro Broadcasting, including Bakke, Fullilove, and Wygant, with a focus on the
standard of review in each. Id. at 2108-11 (citing Regents of Univ. of Calif. v. Bakke, 438 U.S.
265 (1978); Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 citing U.S. 448 (1980); and Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of
Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986)). She noted that each of these cases failed to produce a majority
opinion which "left unresolved the proper analysis for remedial race-based governmental
action," but that Croson somewhat resolved the issue in holding that strict scrutiny should be
the single standard for review for all race-based classifications by state or local governments.
Id. at 2110-11. Justice O'Connor specifically criticized the Metro Broadcasting Court for not
using strict scrutiny as was suggested in Croson, and for undermining the principles set forth
by the cases preceding it, namely skepticism, consistency, and congruence. Id. at 2112-14.
See also supra note 68.
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